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Abstract
We study a modal language for negative operators —an intuitionistic-like negation and its paraconsistent
dual—added to (bounded) distributive lattices. For each non-classical negation an extra operator is hereby
adjoined in order to allow for standard logical inferences to be opportunely restored. We present abstract
characterizations and exhibit the main properties of each kind of negative modality, as well as of the asso-
ciated connectives that express consistency and determinedness at the object-language level. Appropriate
sequent-style proof systems and adequate kripke semantics are also introduced, characterizing the minimal
normal logic and a few other basic logics containing such negative modalities and their companions.
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1 Context
Negationless normal modal logics with box-like and diamond-like operators were
studied by Dunn in [10], where the author obtains completeness results for the sys-
tems characterized by the class of all kripke frames and by a few speciﬁc subclasses
thereof. In [7], Celani & Jansana extend that study so as to cover many other logics,
and to that eﬀect they consider kripke-style semantics based on frames containing
two relations —one of them being a preorder, as in intuitionistic logic, allowing for
the expression of appropriate heredity conditions. Systems containing analogous
negative modalities were studied by Dunn & Zhou, who investigate in [11] modal
logics with conjunction, disjunction, an impossibility operator intended to play the
role of an intuitionistic-like negation and a non-necessity operator intended to play
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the role of a paraconsistent negation. Restall, in [16], proposed a combination of
positive and negative diamond-like modal operators; one of his aims was to use the
resulting system to exhibit examples of modal logics that turn out to be undecidable
even in the absence of classical negation. In the present paper we will study a logic
that contains the already mentioned negative modal operators over a strictly pos-
itive propositional basis (on a fragment agreed upon by intuitionists and classical
logicians) to which we add extra operators that express at the object-language level
the very notions of consistency and determinedness that allows one to recover much
of the standard logical reasoning even when neither classical negation nor classical
implication are available. The mentioned extra modal ‘restoration’ connectives were
ﬁrst proposed in [14]. The basic universal logic apparatus used here is based on [13]
and [15], and the proof-theoretical approach to the consistency operator is inherited
from [3].
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we present the Universal
Logic background, including the formulation of properties characterizing negative
modalities, and the properties that characterize connectives intended to express
consistency and determinedness at the object-language level; in Section 3 a sequent
system is used to deﬁne our main and most basic modal system, in which we include
rules for introducing the restoration connectives and rules for the interaction be-
tween the non-classical negations; in Sections 4 and 5 the intended kripke semantics
is presented for our full modal language and our deductive system is shown to be
sound and complete with respect to this semantics; a few extensions of the basic
system are then formulated in Section 6; in Section 7 we study how the inferences of
more standard logic systems may be recovered with the use of our rich modal lan-
guage, by way of appropriate Derivability Adjustment Theorems; last, in Section 8,
we brieﬂy comment upon some directions for future research.
2 Universal Logic perspective
Let L be a standard propositional language. As customary, we shall use small Greek
letters to denote arbitrary sentences, and capital Greek letters for sets of sentences
of L. A generalized consequence relation (gcr) will here be assumed to be a relation ⊆ 2L × 2L that enjoys the following universal properties:
(ovl) Γ, ϕ ϕ,Δ
(mon) If Γ1 Δ1, then Γ2,Γ1 Δ1,Δ2
(trn) If Γ1, ϕΔ1 and Γ2  ϕ,Δ2, then Γ1,Γ2 Δ1,Δ2
In writing a statement such as Π ∪ {π}  ∅ in the simpliﬁed form Π, π  we are
simply aligning with standard usage from the literature. Here we shall write ΓΔ
to indicate that Γ  Δ fails, that is, that 〈Γ,Δ〉 /∈ . Furthermore, aiming at a
structured outlook on the above properties and on proofs based on them, we shall
employ the following graphical representation:
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(ovl)
Γ, ϕ  ϕ,Δ Γ1  Δ1 (mon)Γ2,Γ1  Δ1,Δ2
Γ1, ϕ  Δ1 Γ2  ϕ,Δ2
(trn)
Γ1,Γ2  Δ1,Δ2
A set Σ ⊆ L will be called a -theory if ϕ ∈ Σ whenever Σϕ,Δ for every Δ ⊆ L.
Dually, the set of sentences Σ will be called a -cotheory if ϕ ∈ Σ whenever Γ, ϕΣ
for every Γ ⊆ L. Taking such deﬁnitions into account, a -theory pair will be
any pair 〈Σ1,Σ0〉 where Σ1 is a -theory and Σ0 is a -cotheory. Given two -
theory pairs Σ = 〈Σ1,Σ0〉 and Π = 〈Π1,Π0〉, we say that Π extends Σ if Σ1 ⊆ Π1
and Σ0 ⊆ Π0 — we denote this by Σ ⊆ Π. In addition, ﬁxed a given gcr , a
theory pair Σ = 〈Σ1,Σ0〉 is called unconnected if Σ1 Σ0, and is called closed if
Σ1 ∪Σ0 = L. A gcr is called trivial if it does not allow for any unconnected theory
pair.
A gcr  is called ﬁnitary if it enjoys the following property:
(ﬁn) If ΓΔ, then there are ﬁnite sets Γ′ ⊆ Γ and Δ′ ⊆ Δ such that Γ′ Δ′
For ﬁnitary gcrs, thus, a connected theory pair extends some ﬁnite connected theory
pair.
We conﬁrm next that ﬁnitary gcrs enjoy the following property — a version of
the well-known Lindenbaum-Asser Lemma (cf. [17]):
Proposition 2.1 Let  be a ﬁnitary gcr. Then every unconnected -theory pair
can be extended into a closed unconnected -theory pair.
Proof. Assume ΓΔ. Let E be the collection of unconnected extensions of 〈Γ,Δ〉,
partially ordered by inclusion, and let C = {〈Ci1,Ci0〉}i∈I be some chain (a totally
ordered set) on E . We claim that ⋃C = 〈⋃i∈I Ci1,⋃i∈I Ci0〉 is an upper bound for E ,
i.e., we claim that Π ⊆ ⋃C for every Π ∈ E (which is obvious) and also claim that
(∗) ⋃C ∈ E .
We check (∗). Where Λ = 〈Λ1,Λ0〉 is a -theory pair, let Fin(Λ) denote the
set of -theory pairs 〈Λ̂1, Λ̂0〉 where Λ̂1 ∪ Λ̂0 is a ﬁnite set and Λ extends 〈Λ̂1, Λ̂0〉.
Consider an arbitrary Φ = 〈Φ1,Φ0〉 such that Φ ∈ Fin(
⋃
C). Then there is some
Ck ∈ C such that Φ ⊆ Ck. Once Ck1Ck0, by (mon) we conclude that Φ1Φ0. By (ﬁn)
it follows that
⋃
C is unconnected. By Zorn’s Lemma, if every chain in a partially
ordered set has an upper bound, then there is a maximal element in that set; so,
we conclude that E must have a maximal unconnected element 〈Γ,Δ〉 ⊇ 〈Γ,Δ〉.
To see that 〈Γ,Δ〉 is indeed closed, suppose there is some ϕ ∈ L such that neither
〈Γ ∪ {ϕ},Δ〉 nor 〈Γ,Δ ∪ {ϕ}〉 are unconnected. Then, by (trn), it would follow
that Γ Δ. 
From this point on we consider some language speciﬁcs, concerning connectives
of L. A binary connective ∧ in L will be called a -ordinary conjunction when
it satisﬁes
(oC) Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ Δ iﬀ Γ, ϕ, ψ Δ
for arbitrary sentences ϕ, ψ ∈ L and arbitrary contexts Γ,Δ ⊆ L. In other words,
to have a classic-like behavior, a conjunction will be expected to internalize, at the
object-level, the meta-level commas that appear in the left-hand side of . Dually,
A. Dodó, J. Marcos / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 300 (2014) 21–45 23
a binary connective ∨ is called a -ordinary disjunction when it satisﬁes
(oD) Γ ϕ ∨ ψ,Δ iﬀ Γ ϕ, ψ,Δ
In addition, a -ordinary top and a -ordinary bottom are 0-ary connectives 
and ⊥ satisfying
(oT) Γ,Δ iﬀ ΓΔ (oB) Γ⊥,Δ iﬀ ΓΔ
From such deﬁnitions one may easily check for instance that:
Proposition 2.2 For any -ordinary conjunction ∧ and any -ordinary disjunc-
tion ∨, the following rule-statements may be shown to hold:
Γ1  α,Δ1 Γ2  β,Δ2
(Cj1)
Γ1,Γ2  α ∧ β,Δ1,Δ2
Γ1, α  Δ1 Γ2, β  Δ2
(Dj1)
Γ1,Γ2, α ∨ β  Δ1,Δ2
Proof. The proofs proceed as follows. We starting with rule-statement (Cj1):
Proof using the properties of gcr Graphical representation of the proof
Assume (1) Γ1  α,Δ1 and (2)
Γ2  β,Δ2. By (ovl) we know
that (3) α∧β  α∧β. By (3) and
(oC) it follows that (4) α, β  α∧
β. Using (trn) on (1) and (4)
we obtain (5) Γ1, β  α ∧ β,Δ1.
From (5), (2) and (trn) we con-
clude that Γ1,Γ2  α∧β,Δ1,Δ2.
(ovl)
α ∧ β  α ∧ β
(oC)
α, β  α ∧ β Γ1  α,Δ1
(trn)
Γ1, β  α ∧ β,Δ1 Γ2  β,Δ2
(trn)
Γ1,Γ2  α ∧ β,Δ1,Δ2
For rule-statement (Dj1) we rely directly on the corresponding tree-like presentation:
(ovl)
α ∨ β  α ∨ β
(oD)
α ∨ β  α, β Γ1, α  Δ1
(trn)
Γ1, α ∨ β  β,Δ1 Γ2, β  Δ2
(trn)
Γ1,Γ2, α ∨ β  Δ1,Δ2 
An immediate oﬀshoot of the above result is that theories are closed under
ordinary conjunctions and cotheories are closed under ordinary disjunctions:
Corollary 2.3 Let ∧ be a -ordinary conjunction, ∨ be a -ordinary disjunction,
 be a -ordinary top and ⊥ be a -ordinary bottom. Consider a -theory pair
〈Σ1,Σ0〉. Then:
(i) If ϕ ∈ Σ1 and ψ ∈ Σ1, then ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Σ1 (iii)  ∈ Σ1
(ii) If ϕ ∈ Σ0 and ψ ∈ Σ0, then ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Σ0 (iv) ⊥ ∈ Σ0
This will be very useful later on, in particular in Section 5. For closed theories, a
further important result may be proven:
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Proposition 2.4 Let ∧ be a -ordinary conjunction and ∨ be a -ordinary dis-
junction, and let 〈Σ1,Σ0〉 be a closed unconnected -theory pair. Then:
(i) If ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Σ1, then ϕ ∈ Σ1 or ψ ∈ Σ1
(ii) If ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Σ0, then ϕ ∈ Σ0 or ψ ∈ Σ0
Proof. For item (i), suppose by contraposition that ϕ /∈ Σ1 and ψ /∈ Σ1. By closure
it follows that ϕ ∈ Σ0 and ψ ∈ Σ0. By the deﬁnition of cotheory, this means that
Γ, ϕ  Σ0 and Γ, ψ  Σ0 for every Γ ⊆ L. For any arbitrary such Γ it follows by
(Dj1) that Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ Σ0. So, given that Σ0 is a cotheory, we have ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Σ0, and
by unconnectedness it follows that ϕ ∨ ψ /∈ Σ1. The proof of item (ii) uses (Cj1).
Fix now a unary connective # in L. We say that # is -preserving if it satisﬁes
(Pvs#) ϕ ψ implies #ϕ#ψ
and say that # is -reversing if
(Rvs#) ϕ ψ implies #ψ #ϕ
Following [15], the minimal conditions we will demand for calling # a negation
consist on the existence of sentences ϕ and ψ such that #ϕϕ and ψ#ψ, that is,
such that the theory pairs 〈#ϕ, ϕ〉 and 〈ψ,#ψ〉 are unconnected. The underlying
intuition is that negation should bring about some ‘inversion’ with respect to the
underlying notion of consequence. It should be noticed that, in principle, a nega-
tion abiding to such minimal conditions need not be -reversing —yet, (Rvs#) is
a typical and desirable property of modal negations such as the ones we will be
studying in the present paper. The following result introduces some properties that
will play an important role in what follows:
Proposition 2.5 Assume ∧ to be a -ordinary conjunction and ∨ to be a -
ordinary disjunction. For any -preserving connective #, the following statements
may then be checked to hold:
(PM1.1#) #(ϕ ∧ ψ)#ϕ ∧#ψ (PM2.1#) #ϕ ∨#ψ #(ϕ ∨ ψ)
If # is -reversing, the following alternative statements may be checked instead:
(DM1.1#) #(ϕ ∨ ψ)#ϕ ∧#ψ (DM2.1#) #ϕ ∨#ψ #(ϕ ∧ ψ)
Proof. The proofs below use rule-statements (Cj1) and (Dj1) from Prop. 2.2.
(ovl)
ϕ  ϕ
(mon)
ϕ, ψ  ϕ
(oC)
ϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ
(Pvs#)
#(ϕ ∧ ψ)  #ϕ
(ovl)
ψ  ψ
(mon)
ϕ, ψ  ψ
(oC)
ϕ ∧ ψ  ψ
(Pvs#)
#(ϕ ∧ ψ)  #ψ
(Cj1)
#(ϕ ∧ ψ)  #ϕ ∧#ψ
(ovl)
ϕ  ϕ
(mon)
ϕ  ϕ, ψ
(oD)
ϕ  ϕ ∨ ψ
(Rvs#)
#(ϕ ∨ ψ)  #ϕ
(ovl)
ψ  ψ
(mon)
ψ  ϕ, ψ
(oD)
ψ  ϕ ∨ ψ
(Rvs#)
#(ϕ ∨ ψ)  #ψ
(Cj1)
#(ϕ ∨ ψ)  #ϕ ∧#ψ
(ovl)
ϕ  ϕ
(mon)
ϕ  ϕ, ψ
(oD)
ϕ  ϕ ∨ ψ
(Pvs#)
#ϕ  #(ϕ ∨ ψ)
(ovl)
ψ  ψ
(mon)
ψ  ϕ, ψ
(oD)
ψ  ϕ ∨ ψ
(Pvs#)
#ψ  #(ϕ ∨ ψ)
(Dj1)
#ϕ ∨#ψ  #(ϕ ∨ ψ)
(ovl)
ϕ  ϕ
(mon)
ϕ, ψ  ϕ
(oC)
ϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ
(Rvs#)
#ϕ  #(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(ovl)
ψ  ψ
(mon)
ϕ, ψ  ψ
(oC)
ϕ ∧ ψ  ψ
(Rvs#)
#ψ  #(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(Dj1)
#ϕ ∨#ψ  #(ϕ ∧ ψ) 
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In what follows we shall say that # has type [+] (read ‘box-plus’) if it respects
(PM1.2#) #ϕ ∧#ψ #(ϕ ∧ ψ)
and say that # has type <+> (‘diamond-plus’) if it respects
(PM2.2#) #(ϕ ∨ ψ)#ϕ ∨#ψ
When a -ordinary top  is available, we will expect a full type [+] connective #
to also respect
(PT#) #
Given an -ordinary bottom ⊥, a full type <+> connective # is also to respect
(PB#) #⊥
Dually, we shall say that # has type [-] (read as ‘box-minus’) if it respects
(DM1.2#) #ϕ ∧#ψ #(ϕ ∨ ψ)
and say that # has type <-> (‘diamond-minus’) if it respects
(DM2.2#) #(ϕ ∧ ψ)#ϕ ∨#ψ
When a -ordinary top  or a -ordinary bot ⊥ are available, a full type [-]
connective # will be expected to respect
(DB#) #⊥
and a full type <-> connective # will be expected to respect
(DT#) #
We now turn to properties induced by our main (non-classical) negations and
use them to characterize the restoration connectives that will accompany them.
Here, given some speciﬁc sentence ϕ, the gcr  will be called #-consistent with
respect to ϕ in case it satisﬁes
(Cns#ϕ) Γ, ϕ,#ϕΔ
for any choice of contexts Γ and Δ. Dually, the gcr  will be called #-determined
with respect to ϕ in case it satisﬁes
(Dtm#ϕ) Γ#ϕ, ϕ,Δ
for any choice of contexts Γ and Δ. A gcr will be called #-inconsistent if there
is some sentence ϕ with respect to which (Cns#ϕ) fails, and will be called #-
undetermined if there is some sentence ϕ with respect to which (Dtm#ϕ) fails.
If some negation # is available such that  turns out to be both #-consistent and
#-determined with respect to all sentences, such # will be called a -ordinary
negation. For #-inconsistent and for #-undetermined gcrs it will often be useful to
have a way of internalizing, at the object-level, the corresponding notions of consis-
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tency and determinedness. To that eﬀect, a -ordinary consistency connective
will be deﬁned as a unary symbol #© satisfying
(GC#) Γ #©ϕ,Δ iﬀ Γ, ϕ,#ϕΔ
for any choice of contexts Γ and Δ and any sentence ϕ. Analogously, a -ordinary
determinedness connective will be deﬁned as a unary symbol #© satisfying
(GD#) Γ, #©ϕΔ iﬀ Γ#ϕ, ϕ,Δ
A useful alternative abstract characterization of such new connectives is exhibited
in what follows:
Proposition 2.6 Let  be a gcr. Then:
[EQ1] Clause (GC#) is equivalent to the following three clauses taken together:
(Cb#) Γ, #©ϕ,#ϕ, ϕΔ (Ck1#) Γ ϕ, #©ϕ,Δ (Ck2#) Γ#ϕ, #©ϕ,Δ
[EQ2] Clause (GD#) is equivalent to the following three clauses taken together:
(Db#) Γ ϕ,#ϕ, #©ϕ,Δ (Dk1#) Γ, #©ϕ, ϕΔ (Dk2#) Γ, #©ϕ,#ϕΔ
Proof. Rule-statement (GC#) may be split in two halves, namely:
Γ, ϕ,#ϕ  Δ
(GC1#)
Γ  #©ϕ,Δ
Γ  #©ϕ,Δ
(GC2#)
Γ, ϕ,#ϕ  Δ
These will help in attaining our goals below. We start by verifying [EQ1].
[Part 1] Assume (GC1#) and (GC2#) to hold. Then notice that:
(ovl)
Γ, #©ϕ  #©ϕ,Δ
(GC2#)
Γ, #©ϕ,#ϕ, ϕ  Δ
(ovl)
Γ, ϕ  ϕ,Δ
(mon)
Γ, ϕ,#ϕ  ϕ,Δ
(GC1#)
Γ  ϕ, #©ϕ,Δ
(ovl)
Γ,#ϕ  #ϕ,Δ
(mon)
Γ, ϕ,#ϕ  #ϕ,Δ
(GC1#)
Γ  #ϕ, #©ϕ,Δ
[Part 2] Assume (Cb#), (Ck1#) and (Ck2#) to hold. Then notice that:
Γ, ϕ,#ϕ  Δ (Ck1#)Γ  ϕ, #©ϕ,Δ
(trn)
Γ,#ϕ  #©ϕ,Δ (Ck2#)Γ  #ϕ, #©ϕ,Δ
(trn)
Γ  #©ϕ,Δ
Γ  #©ϕ,Δ (Cb#)Γ, #©ϕ,#ϕ, ϕ  Δ
(trn)
Γ, ϕ,#ϕ  Δ
Verifying equivalence [EQ2], now, is an entirely analogous exercise, which we shall
leave to the interested reader. 
From this point on we shall ﬁx a set of sentences L inductively deﬁned by:
ϕ ::= p | (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) | (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) | (ϕ) | (ϕ) | (©ϕ) | (©ϕ)
where p ranges over a denumerable set P of propositional variables, both  and 
are symbols intended to represent negation, and the symbols © and © are intended
to represent the restoration connectives that will be associated to the latter negation
symbols. Fixed an arbitrary sentence ϕ, we will deﬁne  as an abbreviation for
ϕ∨ϕ∨ ©ϕ and will deﬁne ⊥ as short for ϕ∧ϕ∧ ©ϕ. In the following sections
we shall introduce a convenient deductive system involving the above connectives,
and provide subsequently a characteristic modal interpretation for them. Using
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such proof system and such interpretation we will be able to easily classify each
connective of L with respect to the terminology introduced above.
It is worth adding a few words on the connection between inconsistency, unde-
terminedness and the perhaps more usual terms ‘paraconsistency’ and ‘paracom-
pleteness’, now very common in the literature on non-classical negations. Suppose
the language of a given gcr  contains a symbol # satisfying the minimal conditions
to be called a negation. In that case, we say that  is #-paraconsistent if there
are sentences ϕ and ψ such that ϕ,#ϕ ψ, and say that  is #-paracomplete if
there are sentences ϕ and ψ such that ϕ#ψ,ψ. Obviously, in case a #-ordinary
bottom ⊥ is available, #-paraconsistency simply coincides with #-inconsistency,
and in case a #-ordinary top  is available, #-paracompleteness coincides with
#-undeterminedness. Paraconsistent logics equipped with ordinary consistency
connnectives constitute particularly interesting examples of the so-called logics of
formal inconsistency, or more simply LFIs (check [6,5]). Their duals, paracom-
plete logics with ordinary determinedness connectives, are called logics of formal
undeterminedness, or LFUs.
As an additional useful matter of notation for the next sections, given T ⊆ L
and any unary connective  we shall by [T ] denote the set {ϕ : ϕ ∈ T}, and by
−1[T ] denote the set {ϕ : ϕ ∈ T}. By T we will denote the complement of T
relative to L.
3 Proof-theoretical presentation
We will introduce in what follows our main sequent systems, namely, proof for-
malisms with each rule has the format
{Ai ⇒ Bi : i ∈ I}
(rule)
A ⇒ B where each Ak and
each Bk represents a ﬁnite sequence of sentences of L and where I is a ﬁnite set of
indices. As usual, given a collection R of rules, a deductive system is associated to
R by deﬁning Γ  Δ to hold if there are ﬁnite sets A ⊆ Γ and B ⊆ Δ such that
A ⇒ B is derivable from the rules in R. In what follows we impose the standard
structural rules, deﬁning the system S:
(id)ϕ ⇒ ϕ A1, ϕ ⇒ B1 A2 ⇒ ϕ,B2 (cut)
A1, A2 ⇒ B1, B2
A ⇒ B
(W/)
A,ϕ ⇒ B
A ⇒ B
(/W )
A ⇒ ϕ,B
Such rules and the very deﬁnition of  are obviously suﬃcient to guarantee that the
corresponding deductive system is a ﬁnitary gcr. As is well-known, the system DL
for distributive lattices is obtained from S by adding the standard rules for (classical)
conjunction and disjunction:
A,ϕ, ψ ⇒ B
(∧/)
A,ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ B
A ⇒ ϕ,B A ⇒ ψ,B
(/∧)
A ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ,B
A,ϕ ⇒ B A,ψ ⇒ B
(∨/)
A,ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ B
A ⇒ ϕ, ψ,B
(/∨)
A ⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ,B
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Where dl is the gcr associated to DL, the interplay between the structural rules
and the logical rules allows us to easily check that both ∧ and ∨ are dl-ordinary, as
well as to derive the usual distributivity rules involving the connectives ∧ and ∨ —
namely, to derive both ϕ∧(ψ∨χ) ⇒ (ϕ∧ψ)∨(ϕ∧χ) and (ϕ∧ψ)∨(ϕ∧χ) ⇒ ϕ∧(ψ∨χ),
as well as their duals, exchanging the roles of ∧ and ∨.
Our main system Kn adds to DL the following logical rules involving the re-
maining connectives of the language L:
A ⇒ ϕ,B A ⇒ ϕ,B
(©/)
A, ©ϕ ⇒ B
A,ϕ,ϕ ⇒ B
(/©)
A ⇒ ©ϕ,B
A ⇒ ϕ,ϕ,B
(©/)
A, ©ϕ ⇒ B
A,ϕ ⇒ B A,ϕ ⇒ B
(/©)
A ⇒ ©ϕ,B
A ⇒ ϕ,B
()
[B],ϕ ⇒ [A]
A,ϕ ⇒ B
()
[B] ⇒ ϕ,[A]
Using the structural rules and the rules for © and ©, it easily follows that (as
in Prop. 2.6):
Proposition 3.1 The following sequents are derivable in Kn:
(GCb) ©ϕ,ϕ, ϕ ⇒ (GDb) ⇒ ϕ,ϕ, ©ϕ
(GCk1) ⇒ ϕ, ©ϕ (GDk1) ©ϕ, ϕ ⇒
(GCk2) ⇒ ϕ, ©ϕ (GDk2) ©ϕ,ϕ ⇒
Recalling the appropriate deﬁnitions from Section 2 and substituting n for ,
one may easily check in Kn the following assertions as derived rules:
Proposition 3.2
(i) ⊥ is a n-ordinary bottom and  is a n-ordinary top
(ii)  is a full type [-] n-reversing connective, and
 is a full type <-> n-reversing connective
(iii) © is a n-ordinary determinedness connective, and
© is a n-ordinary consistency connective
Proof. [⊥ is a n-ordinary bottom]
A ⇒ B
(/W)
A ⇒ ⊥, B
A ⇒ ⊥, B
(def. ⊥)
A ⇒ ϕ ∧ϕ ∧ ©ϕ,B
(GCb)
ϕ,ϕ, ©ϕ ⇒
(∧/)
ϕ ∧ϕ, ©ϕ ⇒
(∧/)
ϕ ∧ϕ ∧ ©ϕ ⇒
(cut)
A ⇒ B
[ is a n-ordinary top]
A ⇒ B
(W/)
A, ⇒ B
A, ⇒ B
(def. )
A,ϕ ∨ϕ ∨ ©ϕ ⇒ B
(GDb)⇒ ϕ,ϕ, ©ϕ
(/∨)⇒ ϕ ∨ϕ, ©ϕ
(/∨)⇒ ϕ ∨ϕ ∨ ©ϕ
(cut)
A ⇒ B
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[ is a full type [-] n-reversing connective]
(GCb)
ϕ,ϕ, ©ϕ ⇒
(∧/)×2
ϕ ∧ ϕ ∧ ©ϕ ⇒
(def. ⊥)⊥ ⇒
()⇒ ⊥
(id)ϕ ⇒ ϕ (id)ψ ⇒ ψ
(∨/)
ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ϕ,ψ
()
ϕ,ψ ⇒ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(∧/)
ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
ϕ ⇒ ψ
()ψ ⇒ ϕ
[ is a full type <-> n-reversing connective]
(GDb)⇒ ϕ,ϕ, ©ϕ
(/∨)×2⇒ ϕ ∨ ϕ ∨ ©ϕ
(def. )⇒ 
() ⇒
(id)ϕ ⇒ ϕ (id)ψ ⇒ ψ
(/∧)
ϕ,ψ ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ
()
(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇒ ϕ,ψ
(/∨)
(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ
ϕ ⇒ ψ
()ψ ⇒ ϕ
[© is a n-ordinary determinedness connective and © is a n-ordinary consistency
connective] To check this, note ﬁrst that rules (©/) and (/©) already do half of
the job. As for the other half:
A, ©ϕ ⇒ B (GDb)⇒ ϕ,ϕ, ©ϕ
(cut)
A ⇒ ϕ,ϕ,B
A ⇒ ©ϕ,B (GCb)ϕ,ϕ, ©ϕ ⇒
(cut)
A,ϕ,ϕ ⇒ B 
The following simple observation follows from Prop. 3.2(ii) and rules (©/) and
(/©), as may be easily checked by the reader:
Proposition 3.3 The sequents ⇒ © and ©⊥ ⇒ are derivable in Kn.
The following result concerns -theory pairs, and will play an important role in
Section 5:
Proposition 3.4 Let 〈Σ1,Σ0〉 be an unconnected -theory pair. Then, the deriv-
ability of the nonempty sequent A ⇒ B implies that either α /∈ Σ1 for some α ∈ A,
or β /∈ Σ0 for some β ∈ B.
Proof. Consider a derivable sequent of the form α1, α2, . . . , αm ⇒ β1, β2, . . . , βn
where m+ n > 0. Using rules (∧/) and (/∨) we may derive the sequent α1 ∧ α2 ∧
. . . ∧ αm ⇒ β1 ∨ β2 ∨ . . . ∨ βn. Call the latter sequent Seq. Suppose αi ∈ Σ1 for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and βj ∈ Σ0 for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n. By Corol. 2.3 and in view of
the fact that ∧ is a -ordinary conjunction and that ∨ is a -ordinary disjunction,
it follows that (i) α1 ∧ α2 ∧ . . . ∧ αm ∈ Σ1 and that (ii) β1 ∨ β2 ∨ . . . ∨ βn ∈ Σ0.
Given that Σ1 is a -theory, from (i) and the derivability of Seq it follows that (iii)
β1 ∨ β2 ∨ . . .∨ βn ∈ Σ1; given that Σ0 is a -cotheory, from (ii) and the derivability
of Seq it follows that (iv) α1 ∧ α2 ∧ . . . ∧ αm ∈ Σ0. Now one may use the sequent
axiom (id) to conclude from (i) and (iv), in case m = 0, that the pair 〈Σ1,Σ0〉 is
not unconnected; the same may be concluded from (ii) and (iii) in case n = 0. 
The next section will introduce an adequate kripke semantics for Kn.
4 Kripke semantics
Here, as usual, a frame F = 〈W,R〉 will be a structure containing a nonempty
set W and a relation R ⊆ W ×W — members of W are often called worlds and R
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is said to be an accessibility relation between these worlds. A state-of-aﬀairs s
on the frame F is a mapping s : P → 2W . A valuation is deﬁned as the recursive
extension of a given state-of-aﬀairs s into a mapping V s : L → 2W , as follows:
V s(p) = s(p), where p ∈ P
V s(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2) = V s(ϕ1) ∩ V s(ϕ2)
V s(ϕ1 ∨ϕ2) = V s(ϕ1) ∪ V s(ϕ2)
V s(ϕ) = {w ∈ W : ∀v ∈ W (wRv implies v /∈ V s(ϕ))}
V s(ϕ) = {w ∈ W : ∃v ∈ W (wRv and v /∈ V s(ϕ))}
V s(©ϕ) = {w ∈ W : w /∈ V s(ϕ) and w /∈ V s(ϕ)}
V s(©ϕ) = {w ∈ W : w /∈ V s(ϕ) or w /∈ V s(ϕ)}
As there is thus a unique valuation V s associated to each given state-of-aﬀairs s,
we will in what follows simply omit the index s from V s. It is helpful to ﬁx at this
point the reading of the statement ‘w ∈ V (©ϕ)’ as guaranteeing the consistency
of ϕ at w, and to ﬁx the reading of the statement ‘w /∈ V (©ϕ)’ as guaranteeing the
determinedness of ϕ at w.
Given the deﬁnitions of ⊥ and  as abbreviations (Section 2), it is easy to check
from the above notion of valuation that V (⊥) = ∅ and V () = W . A model
M = 〈F , V 〉 is a structure where F is a frame and V is a valuation on F . Given
a class of frames F, with the above deﬁnitions we may immediately consider the
class M of all models based on such frames. We say that ϕ ∈ L is satisﬁed at a
state w ∈ W of a model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 if w ∈ V (ϕ); this is denoted by M, w  ϕ.
When w /∈ V (ϕ) we write M, w  ϕ and say that M falsiﬁes ϕ at w. Given two
sets of sentences, Γ and Δ, we say that Γ entails Δ, denoted by Γ |= Δ, when at
every world of every model either some sentence in Γ is falsiﬁed or some sentence
in Δ is satisﬁed; sometimes this deﬁnition is relativized to some given class of frames
on which the relevant models are to be based. It is not hard to check that |= is
a gcr. As usual, the failure of Γ |= Δ will be denoted by Γ |= Δ. When ϕ is
satisﬁed at all states of all models of a given frame F we say that ϕ is valid in F ,
in symbols F  ϕ. The deﬁnition of satisfaction is extended to sequents by writing
M, w  A ⇒ B if M falsiﬁes some ϕ ∈ A at w or M satisﬁes some ϕ ∈ B at w.
Moreover, on what concerns the other deﬁnitions, for any given model M and any
given frame F we write M  A ⇒ B to say that M, w  A ⇒ B at every state w
in M, and write F  A ⇒ B to say that M  A ⇒ B for every model M of F .
Using the above semantics, and taking into account the deﬁnitions in Section 2,
is not hard to check that:
Proposition 4.1 Both  and  enjoy the minimal conditions expected of a nega-
tion. Indeed, for any atomic variables p and q:
(1) p |= p (2) q |= q
(3) p |= p (4) q |= q
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Proof. Consider the frame in which W = {w}, R = ∅ and, based on this frame,
consider a model such that V (p) = ∅ and V (q) = W . It is easy to see that
this is a counter-model that bears witness to (1) and (4). From that a counter-
model witnessing assertions (2) and (3) is built by simply replacing R = ∅ by its
complement R = W ×W . 
Proposition 4.2 The entailment |= is -undetermined as well as -inconsistent.
Proof. Consider a frame F such thatW = {u, v} and R is the total relationW×W ,
and consider a model M such that V (p) = {u} for an atomic variable p. It follows
that V (p) = {u} and V (p) = ∅, thus both p and p are satisﬁed at u, and
both p and p are falsiﬁed at v. 
Our present semantical framework allows us also to provide straightforward ver-
iﬁcations for many inferences which would give rise to long derivations. The fol-
lowing statements that guarantee that consistency propagates through conjunction
and that determinedness propagates through disjunction may indeed very easily be
veriﬁed by the reader.
Proposition 4.3 ©ϕ, ©ψ |= ©(ϕ ∧ ψ) and ©(ϕ ∨ ψ) |= ©ϕ, ©ψ
More importantly, the usual inductive reasoning allows us to establish that any
derivable inference can be checked semantically:
Proposition 4.4 [Soundness] All rules of Kn are sound for frame validity, for
arbitrary frames, that is, the conclusion of each given rule is valid on all frames
that validate the premisses of that rule.
Proof. Let F be some ﬁxed arbitrary frame. We will skip the proof of frame
validity for the standard structural rules and for the standard rules for conjunction
and disjunction, and concentrate below on the distinctive rules of Kn.
Rule (©/) : Assume that (a) F  (A ⇒ ϕ,B) and (b) F  (A ⇒ ϕ,B). Suppose
that F  A, ©ϕ ⇒ B. Then, there are a model M = 〈F , V 〉 and a world w in
M such that M, w  A, ©ϕ ⇒ B. From this we have that (c) M, w  α for
every α ∈ A, (d) M, w  ©ϕ and (e) M, w  β for every β ∈ B. By (c), (e)
and (a) it follows that (f) M, w  ϕ. Now from (c), (e) and (b) it follows that
(g) M, w  ϕ. By the deﬁnition of valuation, (f) and (g), we conclude that
M, w  ©ϕ. This contradicts (d).
Rule (/©) : Assume that (a) F  (A,ϕ,ϕ ⇒ B) and suppose that (b) F 
(A ⇒ ©ϕ,B). By (b) there are a model M and a world w such that (c) M, w  α
for every α ∈ A, (d) M, w  ©ϕ and (e) M, w  β for every β ∈ B. By (a),
(c) and (e) we have that M, w  ϕ or M, w  ϕ, and so M, w  ©ϕ, which
contradicts (d).
Rule (©/) : Assume that (a) F  (A ⇒ ϕ,ϕ,B) and suppose that (b) F 
(A, ©ϕ ⇒ B). By (b) there are a model M and a world w such that (c) M, w  α
for every α ∈ A, (d) M, w  ©ϕ and (e) M, w  β for every β ∈ B. By (a), (c) and
(e) we have that M, w  ϕ or M, w  ϕ, and so M, w  ©ϕ, contradicting (d).
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Rule (/©) : Assume that (a) F  (A,ϕ ⇒ B) and (b) F  (A,ϕ ⇒ B). Suppose
that F  A ⇒ ©ϕ,B. Then, there are a model M and a world w in M such that
M, w  A ⇒ ©ϕ,B. From this we have that (c) M, w  α for every α ∈ A, (d)
M, w  ©ϕ and (e) M, w  β for every β ∈ B. By (c), (e) and (a) we have that
(f) M, w  ϕ, and from (c), (e) and (b) it follows that (g) M, w  ϕ. By (f) and
(g) we have M, w  ©ϕ, which contradicts (d).
Rule () : By contraposition assume that F  ([B],ϕ ⇒ [A]). Then, there
are a model M and a state u in M such that (i) M, u  β for every β ∈ B, (ii)
M, u  ϕ and (iii) M, u  α for every α ∈ A. By (ii) there exists a world v
in M such that (iv) uRv and (v) M, v  ϕ. It follows, by (iii) and (iv), that (vi)
M, v  α for every α ∈ A. From (i) and (iv) it follows that (vii) M, v  β for
every β ∈ B. By (v), (vi) and (vii) we conclude that M, v  A ⇒ ϕ,B, therefore
F  A ⇒ ϕ,B.
Rule () : By contraposition assume that F  ([B] ⇒ ϕ,[A]). Then, there
are a model M and a state w in M such that (i) M, w  β for every β ∈ B, (ii)
M, w  ϕ and (iii) M, w  α for every α ∈ A. By (ii) there exists a world z in
M such that (iv) wRz and (v) M, z  ϕ. It follows, by (iii) and (iv), that M, z  α
for every α ∈ A. From (i) and (iv) it follows that (vii) M, z  β for each β ∈ B. By
(v), (vi) and (vii) we conclude that M, z  A,ϕ ⇒ B, therefore F  A,ϕ ⇒ B. 
As an immediate application of the above soundness result, we may transfer
the results in Prop. 4.2 to our sequent system, and conclude that the consequence
relation  associated to Kg is in fact -undetermined and -inconsistent. For the
same reason, the results in Prop. 3.1 may be transferred to our semantics. With little
eﬀort, results analogous to those in Prop. 3.2 concerning the -ordinary connectives
originally characterized by way of our sequent system may also be restated in our
present modal semantical framework, in which those connectives are conveniently
interpreted. The connections between the two previous approaches will in fact be
strengthened by the completeness result to be proven in the next section.
5 Completeness
Recall from Section 2 that a theory Σ1 and a cotheory Σ0 deﬁne a closed theory pair
if Σ1 ∪ Σ0 = L. For closed theory pairs it will often be simpler thus to refer to the
cotheory Σ0 as Σ1, and we shall follow such policy from this point on, calling the
single theory Π saturated if 〈Π,Π〉 forms a closed (and obviously unconnected)
theory pair. Following the deﬁnition of gcr from Section 3, we will concentrate
below on the gcr  deﬁned by the deductive system for Kn. Given a set of sentences
Ψ, by Ψ we will denote the theory {ψ : Ψ  ψ}, and by Ψ we will denote the
cotheory {ψ : ψ  Ψ}.
The interaction rules of our system Kn allow us to prove some useful properties
of saturated theories:
Lemma 5.1 For any saturated theory Σ:
(i) −1[Σ] is a theory (ii) −1[Σ] is a cotheory
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Proof. [Item (i)] Assume that −1[Σ]  ϕ and suppose by reductio that ϕ /∈
−1[Σ], that is, ϕ ∈ Σ. By the assumption we know that there is some derivable
sequent ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ϕ in Kn where {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn} ⊆ −1[Σ]. From this
sequent, using rule () it follows that ϕ ⇒ ϕ1,ϕ2, . . . ,ϕn is derivable in Kn.
Given that Σ is a theory, ∨ is -ordinary, and ϕ ∈ Σ, then ϕ1∨ϕ2∨. . .∨ϕn ∈
Σ. But Σ is also saturated, thus ϕi ∈ Σ for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by Prop. 2.4(i). It
follows that ϕi ∈ −1[Σ]. Absurd.
[Item (ii)] This is analogous to the previous item, but we now use rule (), the
fact that ∧ is -ordinary and Prop. 2.4(ii). Details are safely left to the reader. 
Let WS be the set of all saturated theories of Kn. Deﬁne over WS the following
binary relation RS :
ΓRS Δ iﬀ −1[Γ] ⊆ Δ ⊆ −1[Γ]
The canonical frame is deﬁned as the structure FS = 〈WS , RS〉.
The two following auxiliary results will be helpful in establishing the proof of
the Canonical Model Lemma, further on.
Lemma 5.2 Let Σ be a saturated theory. Then ϕ ∈ Σ if and only if there is a
saturated theory Π such that ΣRS Π and ϕ /∈ Π.
Proof. Assume ﬁrst that there is some Π such that ΣRS Π and ϕ /∈ Π. Since ϕ /∈ Π
and −1[Σ] ⊆ Π it follows that ϕ /∈ −1[Σ]. From this we conclude that ϕ ∈ Σ.
Conversely, assume that ϕ ∈ Σ. Suppose α ∈ −1[Σ] and β /∈ −1[Σ], and
thus α /∈ Σ and β ∈ Σ. Recall, by Lemma 5.1, that −1[Σ] is a theory and
−1[Σ] is a cotheory. We need to show that there is some saturated theory Π such
that α ∈ Π and β ∈ Π, from which it will follow that ΣRS Π, and such that ϕ /∈ Π.
We claim that the pair P = 〈P1, P0〉 =
〈
−1[Σ],
⌊
−1[Σ] ∪ {ϕ}⌋〉 is -unconnected.
Suppose instead, by reductio, that −1[Σ]  ϕ,−1[Σ]. It follows that there are
ﬁnite sequences of sentences α1, . . . , αm /∈ −1[Σ] and β1, . . . , βn ∈ −1[Σ] such
that α1, . . . , αm ⇒ ϕ, β1, . . . , βn is derivable. Call such sequent Seq. Notice that
αi /∈ −1[Σ] means that (a) αi ∈ Σ, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and β1, . . . , βn ∈ −1[Σ]
means that (b) βj ∈ Σ, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n. From Seq, using rule () it follows
that β1, . . . ,βn,ϕ ⇒ α1, . . . ,αm is also derivable. In view of Prop. 3.4,
from the latter sequent and facts (a) and (b) we may conclude that ϕ /∈ Σ, which
conﬂicts with our initial assumption.
Now that we know that the pair P is unconnected, we may use Prop. 2.1 to
extend it to a saturated unconnected pair P  = 〈Π,Π〉. By construction, α ∈ P1
and β, ϕ ∈ P0, so it follows that α ∈ Π and β ∈ Π, and also that ϕ /∈ Π. 
Lemma 5.3 Let Σ be a saturated theory. Then ϕ ∈ Σ if and only if ϕ /∈ Π for
every saturated theory Π such that ΣRS Π.
Proof. Runs as in the previous result, with the obvious adaptations. 
We deﬁne the canonical model MS as the structure 〈FS , VS〉 where FS is the
canonical frame and VS is the valuation deﬁned by:
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VS(p) = {Γ ∈ WS : p ∈ Γ}
In the proof of the following result it will help to work with the non-canonical
measure of sentence complexity given by the function  : L → N, recursively deﬁned
as follows:
(p) = 0 if p ∈ P
(ϕ ψ) = 1 +max{(ϕ), (ψ)} if  ∈ {∧,∨}
(#ϕ) = 1 + (ϕ) if # ∈ {,}
(#©ϕ) = 2 + (ϕ) if #© ∈ {©, ©}
Lemma 5.4 [Canonical Model]
In the canonical model, for any saturated theory Γ and any sentence ϕ:
MS ,Γ  ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ Γ
Proof. The proof is an induction over (ϕ). The base case ((ϕ) = 0) is trivial,
using (id) and the deﬁnition of the canonical model. Assume now, by Induction
Hypothesis, that MS ,Γ  ϕ iﬀ ϕ ∈ Γ, for any saturated theory Γ and for every
sentence ϕ such that (ϕ) < k. We will detail below the ‘non-local’ cases involving
one of the modal negations and one of the restoration connectives.
[(ψ) = k] By the deﬁnition of satisfaction, we have MS ,Γ  ψ iﬀ MS ,Δ  ψ
for some saturated theory Δ such that ΓRS Δ. Since (ψ) = (ψ) + 1, then
(ψ) < k, thus the Induction Hypothesis applies and allows us to conclude that
MS ,Δ  ψ iﬀ ψ /∈ Δ. From Lemma 5.2 we know that there is a saturated theory Δ
such that ΓRS Δ and ψ /∈ Δ if and only if ψ ∈ Γ. Summing up, we may conclude
that MS ,Γ  ψ iﬀ ψ ∈ Γ.
[(©ψ) = k] Suppose ﬁrst that ©ψ ∈ Γ. In view of the derivability of ©ψ,ψ,ψ ⇒
(Prop. 3.1), from Prop. 3.4 we conclude that either ψ /∈ Γ or ψ /∈ Γ. Given that
both (ψ) < (©ψ) and (ψ) < (©ψ), the Induction Hypothesis guarantees that
ψ /∈ Γ iﬀ MS ,Γ  ψ, and also that ψ /∈ Γ iﬀ MS ,Γ  ψ. By the deﬁnition of
satisfaction we know that MS ,Γ  ψ or MS ,Γ  ψ if and only if MS ,Γ  ©ψ.
It follows from ©ψ ∈ Γ, thus, that MS ,Γ  ©ψ. For the converse, suppose now
that MS ,Γ  ©ψ. By the deﬁnition of satisfaction, the deﬁnition of  and the
Induction Hypothesis, we know that (a) ψ /∈ Γ or (b) ψ /∈ Γ. In case (b), in
view of the derivability of ⇒ ψ, ©ψ (Prop. 3.1), from Prop. 3.4 we conclude that
©ψ /∈ Γ, that is, ©ψ ∈ Γ; in case (a) the same conclusion follows in view of the
derivability of ⇒ ψ, ©ψ. 
As usual, from the above lemma we immediately conclude the following:
Proposition 5.5 [Completeness] If Γ |= Δ then Γ  Δ.
Proof. Suppose by contraposition that Γ  Δ. By Prop. 2.1 there is a closed
unconnected pair 〈Γ,Δ〉 that extends 〈Γ , Δ〉. It follows that Γ is a saturated
theory and that Δ = Γ. By the Canonical Model Lemma, we have MS ,Γ  ϕ
iﬀ ϕ ∈ Γ. Thus, we conclude that Γ |= Δ, and by monotonicity it follows that
Γ |= Δ. 
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6 Extensions of Kn
In the literature it is common to ﬁnd the minimal system of normal modal logic
extended by adding new axioms and to see the resulting system shown to be sound
and complete with respect to a class of frames in which the accessibility relation
enjoys certain appropriate properties. As an illustration of how this strategy may
be applied to our systems with negative modalities, we introduce in this section two
systems that extend Kn. The system T n extends Kn by adding the dual axiomatic
rules ⇒ ϕ,ϕ (rf1) and ϕ, ϕ ⇒ (rf2). Adding the axiomatic rules ϕ ⇒ ϕ (sm1)
and ϕ ⇒ ϕ (sm2) to Kn we deﬁne the system Bn. The gcrs Tn and Bn correspond,
respectively, to the deductive systems associated to T n and Bn.
Recall that a binary relation R is called reﬂexive if xRx holds for every x, and
is called symmetric if xRy implies yRx. In what follows we will show that T n
is sound and complete with respect to the class of reﬂexive frames (i.e., the class
of frames with a reﬂexive accessibility relation), and similarly for Bn and the class of
symmetric frames.
Proposition 6.1 [Correspondence] Let F = 〈W,R〉 be a frame. Then:
(1.1) R is reﬂexive only if F ⇒ ϕ,ϕ and F  ϕ, ϕ ⇒
(1.2) R is reﬂexive if F ⇒ ϕ,ϕ or F  ϕ, ϕ ⇒
(2.1) R is symmetric only if F  ϕ ⇒ ϕ and F  ϕ ⇒ ϕ
(2.2) R is symmetric if F  ϕ ⇒ ϕ or F  ϕ ⇒ ϕ
Proof. (1.1) Assume that (i) R is reﬂexive and suppose that (ii) F ⇒ ϕ,ϕ, for
some sentence ϕ. It follows from (ii) that (iii) M0, w  ϕ and (iv) M0, w  ϕ
for some model M0 of F and some w in M0. From (i) and (iv), the deﬁnition
of valuation gives us (v) M0, w  ϕ. This contradicts (iii). Suppose now that
F  ϕ, ϕ ⇒. Then, there are a model M1 and a world u such that M1, u  ϕ
and M1, u  ϕ. From the latter, invoking the reﬂexivity of R, we conclude that
M1, u  ϕ. Contradiction.
(1.2) Suppose that F is not reﬂexive. Then, there is a worldm such that 〈m,m〉 /∈ R.
Let C be the set {z : 〈m, z〉 ∈ R}. Let p be a propositional variable and let
M2 = 〈F , V 〉 be a model such that V (p) = C. Obviously m /∈ V (p), thus M2
falsiﬁes p at m. Moreover, by construction of C, we have x ∈ V (p) for every x such
that 〈m,x〉 ∈ R. By the deﬁnition of valuation, M2 falsiﬁes p at m. Thus, M2
falsiﬁes ⇒ p,p at m. If we enrich M2 by a propositional variable q such that
V (q) = C, we see that M2 falsiﬁes q, q ⇒ at m.
(2.1) Assume that R is symmetric. Suppose that F  ϕ ⇒ ϕ. There is thus a
model M0 and a state w such that (i) M0, w  ϕ and (ii) M0, w  ϕ. From (i),
there must be some z such that (iii) 〈w, z〉 ∈ R and (iv)M0, z  ϕ. The symmetry
of R allows us to conclude (v) 〈z, w〉 ∈ R from (iii), and from (iv) and (v) it follows
that M0, w  ϕ. This contradicts (ii). If we suppose that F  ϕ ⇒ ϕ we reach
a contradiction through a similar line of reasoning.
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(2.2) Suppose that R is not symmetric. Then there are m,n such that 〈m,n〉 ∈ R
yet 〈n,m〉 /∈ R. Let C be the set {z : 〈n, z〉 ∈ R}. Let p, q be propositional variables
and let M2 = 〈F , V 〉 be a model where V (p) = C and V (q) = C. Since m /∈ V (p),
then M2 falsiﬁes p at m. Given that, for arbitrary z, we have that 〈n, z〉 ∈ R
implies z ∈ V (p), we conclude by the deﬁnition of valuation that M2 falsiﬁes p
at n. Once 〈m,n〉 ∈ R, then M2 satisﬁes p at m. Thus, M2 falsiﬁes p ⇒ p
at m. Similarly, M2 also falsiﬁes q ⇒ q at m. 
Soundness of T n and Bn are corollaries of the ‘only-if’ part of Prop. 6.1. To
illustrate some diﬀerences between those systems we invite the reader to use rules
(sm1) and (sm2) of Bn, on the one hand, and the soundness of T n, on the other
hand, to check that:
Proposition 6.2 Sequents ©ϕ ⇒ ©ϕ and ©ϕ ⇒ ©ϕ are derivable in Bn
but not in T n.
It might be interesting to contrast the latter result concerning the propagation of
consistency through the paraconsistent negation and the dual propagation of de-
terminedness through the paracomplete negation to the earlier general propagation
results in Prop. 4.3.
Completeness will be attained next with the help of the following auxiliary re-
sults.
Lemma 6.3 Assume the theories Γa and Γb to be closed with respect to Tn and Bn .
Then:
(i) In T n we have that ϕ ∨ϕ ∈ Γa.
(ii) In T n we have that ϕ ∧ϕ /∈ Γa.
(iii) In Bn we have that ϕ ∈ Γb implies ϕ ∈ Γb.
(iv) In Bn we have that ϕ ∈ Γb implies ϕ ∈ Γb.
Proof. The ﬁrst two facts follow from closure of Γa and the obvious derivability of
⇒ ϕ ∨ ϕ and ϕ ∧ ϕ ⇒ in T n, in view of axiomatic rules (rf1) and (rf2). The
remaining facts are easy consequences of closure of Γb and the axiomatic rules (sm1)
and (sm2). 
We should guarantee that the canonical construction yields the appropriate prop-
erties:
Proposition 6.4 [Canonical Systems] The systems T n and Bn are canonical.
Proof. For T n we have to show, for the canonical frame FS , that 〈Γ,Γ〉 ∈ RS for
all Γ ∈ WS , that is, −1[Γ] ⊆ Γ ⊆ −1[Γ]. Suppose that ϕ ∈ −1[Γ]. Then, ϕ /∈ Γ.
Since Γ is a closed theory and, by Lemma 6.3(i) and Prop. 2.4(i), ϕ ∨ ϕ ∈ Γ, it
follows that ϕ ∈ Γ. To show that Γ ⊆ −1[Γ] the reasoning is similar, in view of
Lemma 6.3(ii) and Prop. 2.4(ii).
For Bn assume that Γ,Δ are closed theories such that 〈Γ,Δ〉 ∈ RS , that is,
−1[Γ] ⊆ Δ ⊆ −1[Γ]. If ϕ ∈ −1[Δ], then ϕ /∈ Δ. From this we have that
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ϕ /∈ −1[Γ], therefore ϕ ∈ Γ. By Lemma 6.3(iii) we conclude that ϕ ∈ Γ.
Assume now that ϕ ∈ Γ. By Lemma 6.3(iv), ϕ ∈ Γ. It follows that ϕ /∈ [Γ].
Since Δ ⊆ −1[Γ], then ϕ /∈ Δ, that is, ϕ ∈ −1[Δ]. Thus, −1[Δ] ⊆ Γ ⊆ −1[Δ],
that is 〈Δ,Γ〉 ∈ RS . 
Let |=T be the entailment relation deﬁned with respect to the class of all reﬂexive
frames, and |=B be deﬁned for the class of all symmetric frames. An immediate
consequence of Prop. 6.4, proven exactly as in Prop. 5.5, is:
Corollary 6.5 [Completeness for X ∈ {T ,B}] For every Γ ∪Δ ⊆ L:
Γ |=X Δ implies Γ Xn Δ
Having established, for both T n and Bn, that all inferences veriﬁed semantically
are also derivable in the next section we will study the role of these stronger modal
systems in helping to more naturally restore inferences of some standard logical
systems by means of Derivability Adjustment Theorems.
7 Recovering the lost perfection
Let ∼ be a unary negation symbol. Some standard rules for negation that could be
added to the system DL are:
A,ϕ ⇒ B
(/∼)
A ⇒ ∼ϕ,B
A ⇒ ϕ,B
(∼/)
A,∼ϕ ⇒ B
It is easy to see that such rules would characterize ∼ as what we have, in Section 2,
called an ordinary negation, respecting both statements (Cns) and (Dtm). Legiti-
mate non-classical negations, nonetheless, while obviously failing either consistency
or determinedness, may still respect other typical rules of negation. We list be-
low, in particular, some standard sequent rules involving negation and the standard
connectives modeled by a bounded distributive lattice:
A,∼ϕ,∼ψ ⇒ B
(dm1.1)
A,∼(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇒ B
A ⇒ ∼ϕ,B A ⇒ ∼ψ,B
(dm1.2)
A ⇒ ∼(ϕ ∨ ψ), B
A ⇒ ∼ϕ,∼ψ,B
(dm2.1)
A ⇒ ∼(ϕ ∧ ψ), B
A,∼ϕ ⇒ B A,∼ψ ⇒ B
(dm2.2)
A,∼(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇒ B
A ⇒ ϕ,B
(dm3.1)
A ⇒ ∼∼ϕ,B
A,ϕ ⇒ B
(dm3.2)
A,∼∼ϕ ⇒ B
(dm4.1)
A,∼ ⇒ B (dm4.2)A ⇒ ∼⊥, B
We will discuss in this section which of the above rules are derivable and which of
them may be somehow recovered from the viewpoint of each of the sequent systems
studied in the previous sections.
Recall that our language L contains two indigenous symbols for negation, namely,
 and . For those negations it is not hard to check that:
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Proposition 7.1 In Kn:
(i) Rules (dm1.1) and (dm2.1) are derivable for both  and .
(ii) Rules (dm1.2) and (dm4.1) are derivable for .
(iii) Rules (dm2.2) and (dm4.2) are derivable for .
(iv) Rule (dm1.2) fails for , and rule (dm2.2) fails for .
(v) Rules (dm3.1) fails for  and rule (dm3.2) fails for .
In T n:
(vi) Rule (/∼) is derivable for  and rule (∼/) is derivable for .
In Bn:
(vii) Rule (dm3.1) is derivable for  and rule (dm3.2) is derivable for .
Moreover, in either T n or Bn (thus, also in Kn):
(viii) Rule (dm3.2) fails for  and rule (dm3.1) fails for .
(ix) Rule (∼/) fails for  and rule (/∼) fails for .
Proof. Items (i), (ii) and (iii) follow directly from Prop. 3.2(ii) and the second
half of Prop. 2.5. Items (vi) and (vii) follow from the characterizing axioms of T n
and Bn.
To check the remaining items the completeness results in Prop. 5.5 and Corol. 6.5
come in handy. A simple strategy to show that some instance of a given schematic
rule must fail involves falsifying some sequent that is derivable from that rule. On
what concerns item (viii), for example, notice that ∼∼p ⇒ p would obviously be
derivable from (dm3.2), for any atomic sentence p. Yet, to falsify the sequent
p ⇒ p it suﬃces to consider a frame F1 such that W1 = {u, v} and R1 is the
total (thus reﬂexive and symmetric) relationW1×W1, and consider a modelM such
that V (p) = {v}: note indeed that M, v  p, and uR1v and vR1v imply M, u  p
and M, v  p, and thus M, u  p given that uR1x implies x ∈ {u, v}, while
obviously M, u  p. Analogously, p ⇒ ∼∼p would be derivable from (dm3.1), yet
in the model just considered we have M, v  p and M, v  p, thus falsifying
the sequent p ⇒ p.
For item (iv), consider a frame F2 whereW2 = {u, v, w} andR2 = {〈u, v〉, 〈u,w〉},
and a model M′ in which V ′(p) = {v} and V ′(q) = {w}, for atomic sentences p
and q; this is indeed a model that witnesses the failure of (p ∧ q) |= (p ∨ q)
and the failure of p∧q |= (p∨ q). For item (v) one might consider a frame F2
such that W2 = {u, v} and R2 = {〈u, v〉}, and consider a model M′′ such that
V ′′(p) = {u} and V ′′(q) = ∅.
At last, on what concerns item (ix), note that the proof of Prop. 4.2 still applies
unchanged. 
The result in Prop. 7.1(ix) should come as no surprise: As shown in [14], with
the exception of degenerate cases, normal modal logics based on  are paracomplete
and modal logics based on  are paraconsistent. It is interesting to call attention,
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though, to a particular byproduct of the proof of Prop. 7.1(viii): the counter-models
presented to p |= p and to p |= p are based on equivalence relations, and so
one should not expect these two inferences to be valid for any of the usual classes
of frames characterizing modal logics weaker than S5 — in other words, one might
say that the intuitionistic-like negation has indeed a good reason to fail double
negation elimination, and analogously the paraconsistent negation may reasonably
be expected to fail double negation introduction.
Notice now that the rules that are shown to fail in the previous proposition may
often be restored in one way or another, with the help of the connectives expressing
consistency and determinedness in our rich modal language. If, for instance, the
following restored versions of our missing sequent rules turn out to be derivable,
this will help us in ﬁnding conditions under which one can recover some of the lost
inferences:
A,ϕ ⇒ B
(/)◦
A ⇒ ϕ, ©ϕ,B
A ⇒ ϕ,B
(/)◦
A, ©ϕ,ϕ ⇒ B
A ⇒ ϕ,B A ⇒ ψ,B
(dm1.2)◦
A, ©ϕ, ©ψ ⇒ (ϕ ∨ ψ), ©(ϕ ∨ ψ), B
A,ϕ ⇒ B A,ψ ⇒ B
(dm2.2)◦
A, ©(ϕ ∧ ψ),(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇒ ©ϕ, ©ψ,B
A ⇒ ϕ,B
(dm3.1)◦
A, ©ϕ ⇒ ϕ, ©ϕ,B
A,ϕ ⇒ B
(dm3.2)◦
A, ©ϕ,ϕ ⇒ ©ϕ,B
Rules (/)◦ and (/)◦ are obviously derivable from the basic rules (/©) and (©/).
The remaining rules above may be checked with the help of the following sequents:
Proposition 7.2 In Kn the following are derivable:
(SD12) ©ϕ, ©ψ,ϕ,ψ ⇒ (ϕ ∨ ψ), ©(ϕ ∨ ψ)
(SD22) ©(ϕ ∧ ψ),(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇒ ϕ,ψ, ©ϕ, ©ψ
(SD31) ©ϕ, ϕ ⇒ ϕ, ©ϕ
(SD32) ©ϕ,ϕ ⇒ ϕ, ©ϕ
Proof. For (SD12), suppose by reductio that there is a model M with a world w in
which ©ϕ, ©ψ,ϕ,ψ are all satisﬁed and (ϕ ∨ ψ), ©(ϕ ∨ ψ) are both falsiﬁed.
It follows from the joint satisfaction of ©ϕ and ϕ at w that ϕ must by falsiﬁed
at w. The same reasoning applies to ψ, and thus we may conclude that ϕ ∨ ψ
is falsiﬁed at w. From the latter, given that ©(ϕ ∨ ψ) is also falsiﬁed at w, we
conclude that ϕ ∨ ψ is falsiﬁed indeed at every world accessible to w. Note now
that the satisfaction of ϕ at w demands in particular the existence of a world w′
accessible to w. Given that (ϕ ∨ ψ) is falsiﬁed at w, we must also conclude that
ϕ ∨ ψ is satisﬁed at w′. We reach thus a contradiction.
For (SD31), suppose by reductio that in the world w of a model M the sentences
©ϕ and ϕ are both satisﬁed (forcing thereby ϕ to be satisﬁed at any world accessible
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to w), while the sentences ϕ and ©ϕ are both falsiﬁed (forcing ϕ to be falsiﬁed
at any world accessible to w). But to falsify ϕ at w there must ﬁrst of all exist
some world w′ accessible from w. Contradiction.
Items (SD22) and (SD32) are proved similarly. In all cases, completeness may
be used in the end to transfer the semantically veriﬁed results to facts about the
proof formalism. 
It is instructive to contrast the latter result to what we had learned from items (iv)
and (v) from Prop. 7.1.
Instead of axiomatizing Classical Logic (CL) simply by adding rules (/∼) and
(∼/) to DL, we will here axiomatize it in the language L by adding the restored rules
(/)◦ and (/)◦ to DL, plus the two following rules: ⇒ ©ϕ (cns) and ©ϕ ⇒ (dtm).
The associated gcr will be referred to as cl. The intuition behind such system is
precisely that CL is to be obtained by explicitly imposing a universal consistency
assumption as well as a universal determinedness assumption.
At this point we can ﬁnally state:
Proposition 7.3 [Derivability Adjustment Theorem] Let Π#∼ be the result of uni-
formly substituting each occurrence of the symbol ∼ in each sentence of Π by an
occurrence of a unary symbol # ∈ {,}. Then, inferences from CL may be recov-
ered from T n in the following way:
Γ#∼ cl Δ#∼ iﬀ there are ﬁnite sets Σc,Σd ⊆ L such that ©[Σc],Γ Tn Δ, ©[Σd]
Furthermore, Σc may be constrained above to a ﬁnite collection of sub-sentences
of Γ, and Σd may be constrained to a ﬁnite collection of sub-sentences of Δ.
Proof. For the right-to-left direction, ﬁrst one should notice that all the rules
of T n are classically valid. Any derivation constructed in T n may then in principle
be reproduced as a derivation associated to the gcr cl, any occurrence of a sentence
of the form ©ϕ on the left-hand side of a given sequent may be eliminated by cut
using the axiomatic rule (cns), and any occurrence of a sentence of the form ©ϕ on
the right-hand side of a given sequent may be eliminated by cut using the axiomatic
rule (dtm).
For the left-to-right direction, one may proceed by induction on the structure
of the derivations. The base case (0-step derivations) is trivial, and it suﬃces to
take Σc = Σd = ∅. The idea for the remainder of the construction is to collect con-
sistency assumptions and determinedness assumptions on the ﬂy: for each further
step of a CL-derivation intended to witness the fact that A#∼ cl B#∼ , for appropri-
ate ﬁnite sets A ⊆ Γ and B ⊆ Δ, check whether a rule has been used that does
not belong to the common core of the sequent systems for CL and for T n, in that
case, construct the corresponding step in the T n-derivation by using the qualiﬁed
versions of the same rules (taking into account Prop. 7.1 and the rules derived with
the help of Prop. 7.2). For a bit more of detail, suppose the construction of the
classical derivation has proceeded by applying rules (dm1.1) or rule (dm2.1) at a
given derivation step. Then, according to Prop. 7.1(i), exactly the same derivation
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step may be taken in Kn (thus also in T n). Similarly, according to items (ii) and
(iii) of Prop. 7.1, the same steps may be taken in Kn (or in T n) in case (dm1.2) is
used with respect to  or in case (dm2.2) is used with respect to . Now, if (dm1.2)
is expected to be used with respect to , then (dm1.2)◦ should be used instead, and
if (dm2.2) is expected to be used with respect to , then (dm2.2)◦ should be used
instead — notice that in both cases there will be consistency and determinedness
assumptions added to the contexts at the root of the derivation, that is, there will be
sentences added to Σc and to Σd. Finally, notice that any derivation step using rule
(/∼) in a classical derivation may still be taken in T n with respect to , in view of
Prop. 7.1(vi); with respect to  one should use the derivable rule (/)◦ instead —
and in this case an appropriate sentence will be added to Σd. Dually, any classical
derivation step using rule (∼/) may be reproduced in T n with respect to , or be
replaced, with respect to , by a step making use of rule (/)◦, demanding the
addition of an appropriate sentence to Σc. 
The above result could alternatively be checked by using the appropriate con-
sistency and determinedness assumptions to semantically constrain the T n-models
in order to emulate the corresponding CL-models.
In the case of our basic system Kn, a counterpart for the above result would not
try to recover all classical inferences. The natural candidate, in that case, would
be a weaker system, which we brieﬂy mention. Let DM be the system obtained
by adding rules (dm1.1), (dm1.2), (dm2.1) and (dm2.2) to system DL, let DMi be
DM plus (dm3.1), and let DMe be DM plus (dm3.2). Adding both (dm3.1) and
(dm3.2) to DM characterizes the so-called De Morgan Logic (cf. [12]). Now, other
Derivability Adjustment Theorems are to be expected if we ﬁx our attention on the
relation between DMi and the paracomplete fragment of Kn, or on the relation
between DMe and the paraconsistent fragment of Kn. Furthermore, if Bn is used
instead of T n then less consistency and determinedness assumptions will need to be
collected, as iterated negation is more well-behaved by the very design of Bn.
A fully detailed exploration of the latter results on derivability adjustment is
left as matter for a future study.
8 Closing remarks
We have started our study from the logic underlying bounded distributive lattices
and investigated in this paper the logic Kn that upgrades the former by adding a
modal paraconsistent negation and a modal paracomplete negation, and also adds
modal operators internalizing appropriate notions of consistency and determined-
ness into the object-language level. We have characterized the properties of our
connectives from an abstract viewpoint, proposed a sequent-style proof formalism
for the minimal normal system enjoying such properties in our chosen language,
and proven its completeness with respect to the expected standard kripke-like se-
mantics. We have also considered two extensions of our basic system, adding ax-
ioms connected to versions of excluded middle, pseudo-scotus and forms of double
negation manipulation, and we have discussed how these systems allow one to re-
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cover the inferences of some logics lying in between De Morgan Logic and Classical
Logic. Studying other extensions should be instigating inasmuch as they are at-
tained by adding axioms that express intuitively important properties of negation,
such as the ‘controllable forms’ of consistency and of determinedness expressed by
ϕ,(ϕ) ⇒ and ⇒ (ϕ),ϕ, which are valid in euclidean frames. Axioms
that involve the interaction between the two non-classical negations are also at-
tractive, such as ϕ ⇒ ϕ, valid in functional frames, or as ϕ,(ϕ) ⇒ and
⇒ (ϕ),ϕ, valid in transitive frames, or as ϕ ⇒ ϕ, valid in conﬂuent
(a.k.a. Church-Rosser) frames.
Nonetheless, in producing deductive extensions of the basic system without ex-
tending its language, the standard kripke semantics which we have employed has a
somewhat serious shortcoming. Indeed, even though we have thought of our para-
complete negation as independent of our paraconsistent negation, both T n and Bn
were built by adding not just one but two ‘dual’ axioms. It would have seemed more
appropriate, however, to devise complete systems in which each one of those axioms
could be introduced in separate. An obvious alternative to deal with such diﬃculty
related to frame incompleteness is simply to change the semantical framework. Such
a strategy is common in the literature on systems of intuitionistic modal logics, in
which a second relation (a quasi ordering) is added to the frame, coupled with the
consideration of truth-increasing valuations. This seems very well-motivated, and
would allow one to prove in particular that truth is hereditarily preserved towards
the future, according to the order introduced by the second relation, and falsity is
hereditarily preserved towards the past, according to the same order (for the posi-
tive case, cf. [7]; for an application to the case of our modal negations, cf. [11]). The
additional advantage of this alternative framework, besides bringing the heredity
conditions to the fore, is that it allows one to add each axiom in separate, and
continue thinking thus about the two non-classical negations as really independent
of each other. However, that strategy cannot be extended without modiﬁcation to
our richer language. The reason is simple: the restoration connectives were in a
sense designed to fail the heredity conditions, as they allow one to recover standard
classic-like models when they are applied to sentences of a given theory. It rests as
a challenge, thus, to identify the right semantic framework in which the study of ex-
tensions of our system Kn should be done. For one thing, from [14] we already know
that if we add a classical implication connective → to Kn, any normal modal logic
may be rewritten in the minimal language containing just such → and the para-
consistent negation ; in this case indeed the usual classical connectives, the usual
box-plus and diamond-plus connectives, the dual paracomplete negation , and
the restoration connectives dealing with -consistency and with -determinedness
may all be explicitly deﬁned. There is also a rich literature (important references
include [9,18]) concerning the systems obtained by the addition of an intuitionistic
implication instead of a classical implication — for those systems it is customary
to consider interpretation structures containing two accessibility relations, one to
deal with implication and another one to deal with the non-classical negations. In
the present study we have concentrated however on the implicationless fragment of
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these logics, to which the restoration connectives were explicitly added in order to
internalize the corresponding useful meta-theoretical concepts.
Another line of research that we see as potentially fruitful is the investigation
of matters related to variegated versions of our Derivability Adjustment Theorems,
especially from a semantical perspective. We note that there is a modular way of
connecting ‘quasi canonical sequent rules’ such as the main ones we have proposed
in this paper to restrictions concerning the so-called ‘non-deterministic semantics’
(cf. [1,2]). From that viewpoint, one may see how De Morgan Logic gets associated
to four truth-values, where conjunction and disjunction are interpreted as in Dunn-
Belnap matrices, and its negation (both paraconsistent and paracomplete) is deﬁned
according to the so-called truth-order. Furthermore, by adding rule (/∼) a further
determinization is produced, and only three truth-values are left, as negation ceases
to be paracomplete; an analogous phenomenon happens if (∼/) is added, and nega-
tion ceases to be paraconsistent; if both rules are added, Classical Logic is obtained.
Now, if one considers DM from the start, a four-valued semantics is still available,
but negation is non-deterministic: there are two possibilities of output for each of the
four inputs. Such negation may be partially determinized by adding rules (dm3.1)
or (dm3.2); adding both rules would result in the full determinization that corre-
sponds to De Morgan Logic. Our non-classical negations go the other way round, by
deleting some De Morgan rules, (dm1.2) or (dm2.2). The result of performing this
deletion over DM is that disjunction will also start to behave non-deterministically.
Such modular approach may be easily extended to include the consistency and the
determinedness operators, which will also be (non-deterministically) interpretable
over the already mentioned four truth-values (an automated mechanism for uncov-
ering the semantic aspects of such paraconsistent fragments of DM was launched
in [8]). Our Derivability Adjustment Theorems could then be thought of as ways of
taming non-classicality and controlling non-determinism from a logical viewpoint.
Some of the sequent rules that we have studied are more important than others.
Such is the case of the interaction rules () and (), which could be thought
of as a sort of multiple-conclusion sequent calculus contextual generalization of the
so-called ‘Becker’s Rule’, from the traditional modal literature, adapted to the case
of negative normal modalities. To the best of our knowledge, they seem not to
have been proposed before. It is worth noting that by the addition of the usual
sequent rules for classical implication, our system Kn is upgraded into a modal
version of the logic of formal inconsistency BK (see [3]), obtained precisely by the
addition of the already mentioned interaction rules (so, to be sure, Kn plus classical
implication coincides with BK plus interaction rules). Such interaction rules are
indeed absolutely instrumental in warranting the modal character of our systems
(and, in particular, in guaranteeing that we are dealing with systems respecting
the standard replacement property), and it seems worth studying the classes of
paraconsistent and paracomplete logics that lend themselves in a natural way to
reasonable extensions obtained by the addition of such rules. In a future study
we will also show how sequent systems such as those studied in the present paper
may be seen as particular examples of the ‘Basic Sequent Systems’ studied in [4].
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In that paper, the authors have shown how to provide kripke semantics to such
kinds of systems in a way so as to allow one to semantically obtain conﬁrmations
of important proof-theoretic properties such as cut-admissibility and analyticity.
In showing that the mentioned approach indeed applies to our systems, we will
guarantee that one can count on such proof-theoretic properties, provide alternative
completeness proofs and allow for a smoother extension of our systems to normal
systems characterized by other important classes of frames.
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